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RESEARCH SUBPOENAS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
SHEILA JASANOFF*
I
INTRODUCTION
Like Moliere’s Monsieur Jourdain on learning that he had been speaking
prose for forty years, most U.S. judges would probably be astonished to find
that their everyday assessments of scientific evidence recapitulate some of the
the imposition of serious financial liability or restraints on personal liberty?
And when conflicts occur between alternative approaches to interpreting scien-
tific information, who should decide which approach is better?
Questions like these have arisen in remarkably diverse factual contexts, and
they tax judicial understandings of how scientific research is done.  For exam-
ple, the landmark environmental controversies of the 1970s and 1980s invited
courts to compare legal and scientific standards of certainty and to give admin-
istrative agencies a reasoned basis for acting as they did when there was no
consensus in science to guide them.
2  Toxic tort claims pitted medical and scien-
tific experts against each other, requiring courts to assess their relative credi-
bility as well as their competence to testify on matters relevant to determina-
tions of liability.3  Requests to exclude various types of novel scientific evidence
forced courts to act in effect as gatekeepers for scientific methodologies and
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1. Particularly influential works in this genre include THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); KARL V. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE (1972).
2. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87
(1983); Gulf South Insulation v. United States Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir.
1983); Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
3. Representative cases over more than a decade include In re Paoli RR Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717 (3d Cir. 1994); Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Paoli RR
Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S.
961 (1991); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 ERC 2017 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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practices of uncertain reliability.4  In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,5 the Supreme Court attempted to systematize judicial thinking on these is-
sues with a new rule on the admissibility of scientific evidence.
The research subpoena cases discussed in this symposium present similar
challenges, but perhaps in even sharper form.  In evaluating research subpoe-
nas, courts regularly have dealt with questions concerning the relevance and
reliability of the requested materials,6 the balance between the requesting
party’s interest in disclosure and the researcher’s interest in confidentiality,7 the
reasonableness of the burden on the researcher or the researcher’s institution,8
and the possible right of experts to be protected against legal intrusions.9  There
is, however, an epistemological dimension to research subpoenas that to this
point has received relatively little attention from judges and legal analysts.10
Once materials are obtained by subpoena, are courts institutionally competent
to take the next step beyond gatekeeping?  That is, can they evaluate both the
probity and scientific validity of these materials and their adequacy as a foun-
dation for challenged evidence?
Advocates contend that subpoenaed research information allows the re-
questing party, and in due course the legal fact finder, to determine whether the
reported scientific results were properly derived from the researcher’s under-
lying acts of observation, recording, and interpretation.11  But this attempt to
reassess in a legal forum what scientists know, and how they come to know it,
threatens to put both judges’ and attorneys’ lay conceptions of “the scientific
method” on a collision course with scientists’ actual practices.  Drawing on re-
                                                          
4. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (on the statistical
technique of “meta-analysis”); People v. Ojeda, 225 Cal. App. 3d 404 (1990) (on “horizontal gaze nystag-
mus,” a field test for drunk driving); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989) (on “DNA typing”).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982); Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97
F.R.D. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1983), vacated sub nom. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th
Cir. 1984).
7. See, e.g., Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 559; Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 355, 357
(N.D. Ga. 1984), aff’d, 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Judith A.
McKenna, Researchers’ Reactions to Compelled Disclosure of Scientific Information, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 67, 88-91 (Summer 1996).
8. See, e.g., In re Application of Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1523 (2d Cir. 1989); Dow Chemi-
cal, 672 F.2d at 1267; Anker v. G.D. Searle & Co., 126 F.R.D. 515, 518-19 (M.D.N.C. 1989); In re Applica-
tion of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 729, 732 (1987).
9. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Jan. 4, 1984, 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y.), rev’d and
remanded, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984); Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982); see also
Paul D. Carrington & Traci L. Jones, Reluctant Experts, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (Summer 1996);
Michael Traynor, Countering the Excessive Subpoena for Scholarly Research, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS.  119, 120 (Summer 1996).
10. On possible conflicts between the judicial interest in open discovery and scientists’ interest in con-
trolling who should evaluate science, see SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 98-99 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Court Orders “Sharing” of Data, 261 SCI. 284 (1993).  For this purpose,
researchers may be asked to produce any or all of the following types of documents: unpublished working
papers; research protocols; written commentaries on or criticisms of research designs; documents pertain-
ing to peer review of protocols and findings; questionnaires, letters, and interview forms; responses to in-
terviews; field notes; data on causes of death; and data sheets or computer disks recording raw data.  See
In re Application of Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1523.
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cent research in the sociology of science, this article seeks to identify the points
at which disjunctions between judges’ and scientists’ perceptions of science are
most likely to occur and to propose methods by which courts can reduce the
risk of judging science by ad hoc, arbitrary, and inappropriate standards.
II
WHY SUBPOENA RESEARCH RECORDS?—SOME COMMON ASSUMPTIONS
Requests for the records on which scientists have based their published
findings may be motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate considerations.
Litigants may try to use the research subpoena to intimidate and overburden
researchers or to introduce irrelevant and confusing issues into the fact-finding
process.12  As discussed elsewhere in this symposium, vigilance by judges and
researchers offers the best protection against such unjustified “fishing expedi-
tions.”13
More serious and conceptually more interesting are the cases in which liti-
gants expect to find genuine discrepancies between the “facts” reported by sci-
entists and the observations on which their findings were based.  The expecta-
tion that research subpoenas will enable courts to distinguish between valid and
invalid scientific claims appears to rest on certain widely held but empirically
questionable assumptions about the practice of science:
 that scientific records are kept in accordance with standardized and
generally accepted rules;
 that evidence of fraud, error, and poor scientific practice can be de-
tected unambiguously from written records;
 that challenged methodologies (including methods of analysis and
interpretation) clearly conform or do not conform to “scientific”
standards;
 that such standards preexist and hence can be mechanically applied
during legal inquiry; and
 that the adversarial process is conducive to sorting out disputes con-
cerning the validity and reliability of competing research practices.
In fact, as seen below, each of these assumptions is at odds with well-
established findings in the sociology of science.  They are further contradicted
by the experience of legal institutions in evaluating novel scientific evidence
and investigating claims of scientific misconduct.
                                                          
12. Abuses of the discovery process are most likely to occur in high-stakes mass tort cases.  See
MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST IMPLANT CASE 142-46 (1996) (describing a research subpoena by a plaintiff’s attorney for docu-
ments of a type that did not exist, such as evidence of improper financial dealings between herself and im-
plant manufacturers); Gina Kolata, Legal System and Science Come to Differing Conclusions on Silicone,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at D6 (describing “staggering” demand for documents served on the principal
author of article on breast implants).
13. See, e.g., Barbara B. Crabb, Judicially Compelled Disclosure Of Researchers’ Data: A Judge’s
View, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 26-32 (Summer 1996); Michael Traynor, supra note 9, at 120.
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III
THE CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION OF SCIENCE
Although scientific knowledge and discovery are commonly represented as
the product of the genius-scientist’s lonely, heroic struggles with nature, recent
scholarship accords greater prominence to the mundane and collective aspects
of scientific activity.  Through detailed descriptions of laboratory work and
other forms of scientific practice, researchers have shown that the production
of facts and bodies of knowledge is invariably embedded in a matrix of social
interactions, agreements, and understandings.14  Scientific knowledge, according
to these studies, must be communally certified to be legitimate; it must be sub-
scribed to by groups of like-minded investigators, not asserted as indisputable
truth by isolated individuals.  Negotiation within and among scientific commu-
nities establishes the conventions for acceptable research and determines
whether a given scientist’s work falls within or outside the boundaries of good
science.15  These observations are frequently summarized in the statement that
science is socially constructed.16
The model of social construction has several important implications for le-
gal fact-finding.  First, as seen from this perspective, the scientific method looks
neither singular nor static, but rather is continually renegotiated within par-
ticular research communities so as to accommodate new observations and
technical capabilities.  Comparison across scientific sub-disciplines shows that
even the most basic principles of the scientific method, such as the use of ex-
perimental controls, may vary to some degree from one area of science to an-
other.  For example, though mixing historical and contemporaneous controls
may be strictly forbidden in molecular biology, it may be accepted practice
when conducting studies of drug safety and efficacy on human or animal popu-
lations.17  Scientific facts are therefore most authoritative when they have been
generated in accordance with the established conventions of some well-defined
field or discipline.  At the same time, there are no abstract, universally applica-
ble standards against which the validity of scientific facts can be tested.
Second, in evolving areas of science it may take time and considerable dis-
cussion among researchers to reach a consensus on the validity of new research
methodologies and criteria of evaluation.  Thus, in his classic analysis of how
the Wassermann test for syphilis gained acceptance, the German biologist
Ludwik Fleck described the emergence of a scientific “thought collective” that
                                                          
14. For a helpful review of this literature, see Steven Shapin, Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Sci-
entific Knowledge, 21 ANNUAL REV. OF SOC. 289 (1995).  See also H.M. COLLINS & TREVOR PINCH, THE
GOLEM: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SCIENCE (1993); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN
ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987).
15. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 61-83 (1990).
16. See Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know about the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRICS
345 (1992).
17. See JASANOFF, supra note 15, at 75-76 (illustrating differences among scientific specialties, and
individual practitioners, on the use of controls).
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eventually ratified the test’s efficacy.18  Until such a consensus is stabilized,
there may be genuine doubt and a legitimate plurality of thought about the va-
lidity of particular research approaches.  In reflecting on the history of the
Wassermann test, Fleck concluded that
[t]he following facts are therefore firmly established and can be regarded as a para-
digm of many discoveries.  From false assumptions and irreproducible initial experi-
ments an important discovery has resulted after many errors and detours.  The principal
actors in the drama cannot tell us how it happened, for they rationalize and idealize
the development.  Some among the eyewitnesses talk about a lucky accident, and the
well-disposed about the intuition of a genius.  It is quite clear that the claims of both
parties are of no scientific value.19
Fleck’s solution to this paradox was to stress the non-individualistic charac-
ter of valid scientific knowledge, a solution that has gathered strength from
subsequent work in the sociology of science.20  Moreover, the knowledge that a
“thought collective” or scientific subculture holds in common may be impossi-
ble to reduce to formal principles; rather, it may consist in large part of tacit
knowledge, experience, and skill.21  If this is the case, only those who belong to
the relevant subculture may be truly in a position to evaluate each other’s com-
petence.  Outsiders to the subculture may not be able to discriminate as readily
between skilled and unskilled research practices in that field.
Third, the model of social construction highlights the role of prior negotia-
tion and consensus building in the determination of whether an experiment or a
study has been successfully replicated.  Agreement is required to establish that
one result is “the same” as another, because absolute identity in experimental
conditions or in results can never be achieved.  Experiments, moreover, in-
variably are matters of skill; talented experimentalists are sometimes said to
have “golden hands.”  Therefore, failure to obtain “the same” results as those
in a prior experiment can always be attributed to the second investigator’s lack
of competence rather than to the mistakes or misinterpretations of the first.
Disputes about replication—and indeed about scientific validity more gener-
ally—often degenerate into what H.M. Collins has termed “experimenter’s re-
gress,” a potentially endless series of questions designed to probe every aspect
of the “failed” experiment, from the reliability of the instruments used to the
honesty of the researchers.22  Such disputes are most likely to arise in novel or
developing, and hence relatively unstandardized, fields of science.
Standardization of research protocols and evaluation criteria is one widely
accepted safeguard against “experimenter’s regress.”  If researchers can agree
                                                          
18. LUDWIK FLECK, GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SCIENTIFIC FACT (1979) (originally pub-
lished as DIE ENTSTEHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG EINER WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN TATSACHE (1935)).
19. Id. at 76 (emphasis in original).  For an ethnographic approach to scientific fact-making, see
BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS
(1979).
20. See SHEILA JASANOFF ET AL., HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (1995).
21. H.M. Collins, The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks, 4 SCI. STUD. 165 (1974).
22. H.M. COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 2
(1985) (describing experimenter’s regress); see also H.M. Collins, The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociol-
ogy of a Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments in Physics, 9 SOC. 205 (1975).
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in advance on what significance they will attach to variations in controls or
other background conditions, they may prevent subsequent conflicts over dis-
crepancies in the results obtained by different researchers conducting “the
same” experiment.  Standardization only works, however, if everyone con-
cerned agrees to play by the designated rules.  When scientific results are dis-
puted, it is frequently because dissenters from within a given scientific commu-
nity, or observers from outside it, have begun to question their colleagues’
methodological compromises or tacit assumptions.
Scientific claims are especially prone to being pulled apart, or decon-
structed, when they are used to justify significant legal or political decisions.
Skepticism is institutionalized in these settings.  The familiar courtroom “battle
of experts” is made possible, in part, by the fact that consensus in science is
usually provisional and hardly ever all-inclusive.  An expert witness who hap-
pens not to subscribe to the governing consensus can sow reasonable doubt
about the reliability of particular scientific practices, the adequacy or com-
pleteness of specific interpretive frameworks, the comparative saliency of dif-
ferent kinds of evidence, and the credibility of competing experts.23  In short,
litigation presents not so much a contest between “true” and “false” beliefs24 as
a test of the strength and unanimity of the prevailing consensus.
IV
STANDARDS AS A RESPONSE TO SKEPTICISM
Contrary to the expectations of many judges, standards for conducting valid
scientific research in a given field may not exist or may not have been firmly
codified before a legal controversy begins.  In such cases, the legal dispute itself
becomes an occasion for debating competing scientific claims and may indi-
rectly promote standardization.  Past controversies surrounding the exclusion
of DNA typing evidence present one example of such a process.
The lack of standardized methods for interpreting DNA evidence became
readily apparent in the 1989 sexual molestation case of Maine v. McLeod.
Lifecodes Corporation, a commercial testing laboratory, conducted scientific
analysis of the evidence in the case and claimed that it had identified a match
between separate DNA samples taken from the suspect and the crime scene. 25
Such determinations are ordinarily made on the basis of a pattern of bands re-
sembling a supermarket bar code (the so-called “fingerprint”) that is derived
through the process of gel electrophoresis.26  Although Lifecodes asserted that
                                                          
23. See generally EXPERT EVIDENCE: INTERPRETING SCIENCE IN THE LAW (Roger Smith & Brian
Wynne eds., 1989).
24. This rather reductionist view of scientific controversies in the courtroom has, of course, gained
wide currency among both legal practitioners and the public.  See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
25. See Colin Norman, Maine Case Deals Blow to DNA Fingerprinting, 246 SCI. 1556 (1989).
26. To obtain a DNA “fingerprint,” long molecules of DNA are first cut into fragments of varying
lengths with the use of special restriction enzymes.  The fragments are separated by size through a
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it had found a match, the bands from the two samples did not line up perfectly.
The distribution of the bands was the same in both prints, but the entire pattern
was displaced in a way that suggested the DNA fragments from one sample
were slightly larger and heavier than those in the other, and thus had traveled
shorter distances through the electrically charged gel.  On what basis, then, had
Lifecodes declared the two prints identical?
Experts from Lifecodes revealed at trial that they had employed a previ-
ously unreviewed and unpublished methodology to reconcile the differences
between the two DNA prints.27  A device known as a monomorphic probe had
been used to tag a particular fragment of DNA that is the same in every person.
Extrapolating from the relative displacement of this tagged fragment, the
Lifecodes experts had concluded that all of the bands in the seemingly dis-
placed sample should be corrected by a factor of 3.15%, a calculation that en-
abled them to treat the bandshifting as immaterial.
Subsequent discussion among scientists both inside and outside the court-
room showed that the technique used by Lifecodes was far from generally ac-
cepted.28  Nor was there, as yet, a generally accepted alternative on which most
molecular biologists could agree.  Once their interest was awakened, research-
ers not only questioned Lifecodes’s methods and tacit assumptions but also be-
gan proposing a variety of techniques that they asserted would work better.
One defense expert stated, “The whole experiment wasn’t done with the kind
of rigor you would expect.”29  An exchange of letters in Science carried the
“experimenter’s regress” still further, pinpointing specific technical options that
Lifecodes should have considered and either should have adopted or explicitly
ruled out. 30
These criticisms underscored the fact that Lifecodes’s declaration of a
match was contingent upon a particular testing technique, namely the use of
monomorphic probes, whose acceptance within a wider scientific community
had never been openly debated and was by no means a foregone conclusion.
Leading scientists agreed that controversies such as the one that occurred in
Maine v. McLeod had the beneficial effect of exposing unresolved and impor-
tant technical issues.31  The “black box” of DNA typing was usefully opened up
                                                          
process called electrophoresis.  This involves placing samples of DNA fragments on an electrically
charged gel where smaller fragments move faster than larger ones.  When the process is concluded,
DNA fragments of different lengths congregate in separate bands along the gel.  Radioactive probes
are then used to obtain a picture of their distribution.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 36-37 (1992).
27. Norman, supra note 25, at 1558.
28. Id.  The standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence at the time of the Maine case was that
of “general acceptance” in the scientific community.  See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923).
29. Norman, supra note 25, at 1557.
30. See Letters: DNA Fingerprinting, 247 SCI. 1018-19 (1989).
31. Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 NATURE 735,
735 (1994) (“The initial outcry over DNA typing standards concerned laboratory problems: poorly de-
fined rules for declaring a match; experiments without controls; contaminated probes and samples; and
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to a kind of extended peer review as scientists openly evaluated alternative
methods of interpreting such evidence.  Confrontations between prosecution
and defense DNA experts thus prevented the overly rapid acceptance of a
technique whose use in criminal trials could influence jury decisions on whether
to deny a defendant his life or liberty.  Litigation in this instance prompted the
scientific and legal communities to cooperate in developing standard ap-
proaches to DNA typing that would prove more resistant to criticism.32
In other instances, however, scientific disagreements arising under the de-
constructive pressure of litigation may point less persuasively to correctable
flaws in theory or practice.  Conflicts between experts may merely highlight ar-
eas of ambiguity where multiple approaches and interpretations could peace-
fully coexist, and may even create a misleading impression of uncertainty where
most scientists believe none exists.33  Locating disputes among experts on a con-
tinuum ranging from clearly meritorious to probably specious presents formi-
dable difficulties for non-specialist courts; yet, this is precisely the kind of as-
sessment that judges may be called upon to make in research subpoena cases.
V
AMBIGUOUS DISCREPANCIES
In litigation initiated by victims of toxic shock syndrome, Procter and Gam-
ble sought the names and addresses of women who had been interviewed by the
Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) so that the company could reinterview
the women and thereby validate the CDC’s results.34  Such requests rest on the
suspicion that raw data and interview records will disclose evidence of scientific
fraud or incompetence.35  On many occasions, however, the line between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable scientific practice may be much less clear than a re-
search subpoena presupposes.  Conflict about the amount of misconduct that
exists in the U.S. scientific community offers prima facie support for this point.
Two highly publicized cases of scientific misconduct that shook American
biomedical science in the 1980s cast light on the kinds of interpretive ambigui-
ties that may arise in litigation involving subpoenaed research materials.  The
first case grew out of a dispute between Robert Gallo of the U.S. National In-
stitutes of Health (“NIH”) and Luc Montagnier of France’s prestigious Pasteur
                                                          
sloppy interpretation of autoradiograms.”).
32. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL: THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996);
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992).
33. Arguably, this is what happened in a number of trials involving the prescription drug Bendectin.
For a review of the legal and scientific issues in these cases, see Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence:
The Testimony of Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
34. Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble, 101 F.R.D. 355 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Wiggins & McKenna, supra
note 7, at  81.
35. See, e.g., WILLIAM BROAD & NICHOLAS WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH (1985).
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Institute over which of the two scientists had first isolated the human immu-
nodeficiency virus (“HIV”) suspected of causing AIDS.  The second case fo-
cused on the allegation that Thereza Imanishi-Kari, a scientist at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), had falsified some of the data reported
in an article she had co-authored with, among others, the Nobel laureate David
Baltimore.  Both cases involved an exhaustive inquiry into the relationship be-
tween published scientific results and the records (including notebooks, memo-
randa, slides, and other forms of data) on which they were supposedly based.
In each case, investigators from outside the relevant research community
played a major role in determining whether misconduct had occurred.  More
importantly, it proved easier in both cases to deconstruct and undermine claims
made by particular individuals than to produce a coherent, compelling account
of the research practices that would have been appropriate.
A.  The Gallo Case
On March 31, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and French Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac issued a joint statement acknowledging that U.S. and French
scientists had jointly discovered the cause of AIDS and that both would share
the patent rights to the invention of the AIDS blood test.36  This official state-
ment was backed by a twenty-three page “history” composed by the disputing
parties.  Despite the formal end to the controversy, John Crewdson, a Pulitzer
prize winning reporter for the Chicago Tribune, conducted a twenty-month in-
vestigation into suggestions that Gallo and his American colleagues had wrong-
fully appropriated the AIDS virus from Montagnier and the Pasteur group.37  In
a lengthy report published on November 19, 1989, Crewdson set out in pains-
taking detail the raft of disparities that he had uncovered between Gallo’s ac-
counts of the chronology of the discovery and the records actually made in
Gallo’s laboratory during the period in question.  Crewdson’s tenacious inquiry
left little doubt, at least in his mind, that the American group’s role in this mo-
mentous achievement raised serious questions about research ethics, honesty,
and professionalism.  Gallo’s publication of the “genetic twin” of a virus iso-
lated a year earlier in France, Crewdson concluded, must have been “either an
accident or a theft.”38
Spurred by Crewdson’s article and heightened public concern with scientific
fraud and misconduct,39 the NIH launched a tortured and ultimately inconclu-
sive investigation into the behavior of Gallo and his principal colleague and
                                                          
36. John Crewdson, The Great AIDS Quest, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1989, §§ 5, 15.
37. Id. at 11.  The degree of genetic identity between the LAV virus isolated by the Pasteur group
and the HTLV-3 virus isolated and used to develop the AIDS blood test by the NIH group left little
doubt that they were not merely closely related but virtually the same.  The rapid mutation rate of the
AIDS virus as it is transferred from patient to patient essentially ruled out the possibility of an acci-
dental similarity, possibly occasioned by close contact between the patients carrying the two viruses.
The remaining possibilities were accidental or purposeful contamination occurring in Gallo’s lab.
38. Id.
39. See generally BROAD & WADE, supra note 35 (reviewing many instances of scientific misconduct
that aroused public attention in the early 1980s).
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coauthor, Czech-born virologist Mikulas Popovic.40  Questions centered on
whether Gallo and Popovic had actively fabricated, falsified, or misrepresented
data or whether they had otherwise deviated from accepted research practices.
Inevitably, as in research subpoena cases, the misconduct inquiry necessitated a
look behind the claimed scientific facts and a skeptical second-guessing of the
means by which they had been produced.
One issue of research practice spotlighted in Crewdson’s report and in the
subsequent NIH investigation exemplified, in concentrated form, the problems
of tacit knowledge, interpretive flexibility, and experimenter’s regress that have
been noted by sociologists of scientific knowledge.  It was discovered that
Popovic had pooled viruses taken from up to ten different AIDS patients in a
single culture in order to induce the virus to replicate. 41  Was this good science
or a recipe for deception?  Popovic’s experiment proved successful, as the
AIDS virus, HTLV-3, was ultimately isolated from his pooled culture.  At the
same time, however, pooling made it more difficult to trace the exact genealogy
of HTLV-3, and thus to resolve the legally and ethically significant mystery of
how HTLV-3 came to be nearly identical to the French virus LAV, which was
also present in cultured form in Popovic’s laboratory.
Crewdson’s interviews revealed substantial differences of opinion among
scientists concerning the validity of Popovic’s method.
Asked why Popovic had pooled patient materials in his quest for the virus, Gallo re-
plied: “To any virologist, it’s obvious why.  Anybody knows why we would mix.  We
weren’t doing well with singles and you’re trying to complement.  Mika is a classic vi-
rologist.  He comes from the old school in Prague, which used to be No. 1 in the
world.”  The reaction among Popovic’s colleagues, however, has been mostly one of
puzzlement mixed with dismay that the genealogy of the AIDS virus that has become
the diagnostic “gold standard” is lost to history.
“As a virologist, you don’t throw lots of viruses into one culture,” says Jay Levy.
“You do it independently.”  Lee Ratner, the scientist who coordinated the genetic se-
quencing of the AIDS virus in Gallo’s lab agrees: “It was not the cleanest scientific
experiment.  It confused things endlessly.  I don’t know why you would ever mix
things.  All I know is Mika did it.”42
Was Popovic an inspired experimentalist trained, as Gallo asserted, by
“classic” methods at the “No. 1” school in the world?  Or was he a scientific
renegade whose unorthodox practices “stole” a seminal discovery from some-
body else?  The point to note for our purposes is that all the twists and turns of
the extensive NIH misconduct investigation failed to yield definitive answers to
these questions.  Popovic was deemed in turn a hero, a suspect, and a victim of
excess investigative zeal.  Courts, lacking the flexibility to revisit the same liti-
gation twice, may render judgments that appear more conclusive, but their ap-
parent finality should not obscure the fact that the underlying subject matter is
equally open to multiple readings.
                                                          
40. See, e.g., Joseph Palca, “Verdicts” Are in on the Gallo Probe, 256 SCI. 735 (1992).
41. Crewdson, supra note 36, at 12.
42. Id.
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B.  The Imanishi-Kari Baltimore Case
Thereza Imanishi-Kari’s work at MIT gained notoriety even though it was
conducted for lower stakes and under less competitive circumstances than the
race to find the AIDS virus.  Like Gallo, Imanishi-Kari also was ultimately ex-
onerated,43 but the protracted inquiry into her scientific integrity proved just as
inconclusive a device for uncovering “the truth.”  In this case, suspicion was
aroused by Margot O’Toole, a junior researcher in Imanishi-Kari’s lab, who
had repeatedly failed to replicate an experiment using a reagent characterized
by her superior in a co-authored paper published in the journal Cell.  Imanishi-
Kari blamed O’Toole’s incompetence for the failed experiments, whereas
O’Toole became convinced that some of the data underlying the Cell paper had
been deliberately falsified.  O’Toole’s suspicion was intensified when she acci-
dentally came upon seventeen pages of missing lab notes that seemed to show
different results from those reported by Imanishi-Kari.
What began as a perfectly commonplace dispute between two scientists
snowballed into a public drama of national proportions.  Scientific fraud was
already on the political agenda, as demonstrated by the Gallo case.  O’Toole’s
charges, moreover, implicated not only Imanishi-Kari and MIT, but also David
Baltimore, one of the country’s most eminent and powerful scientists and a co-
author of the controversial Cell paper.  Inquiries launched by a congressional
subcommittee chaired by Representative John Dingell44 and by NIH’s Office of
Scientific Integrity (“OSI”)45 kept the case in the limelight as a symbol of what
many saw as science’s disgraceful lack of accountability to the public.  More
important for our purposes, the investigations generated two crucially different
interpretations of Imanishi-Kari’s behavior—that she was guilty of fraud or that
she had committed pardonable error—each supported by evidence from her
scientific records.  The parties, interests, and observations that constituted the
“fraud story” and the “error story” have been described by the historian of sci-
ence, Daniel Kevles.46
1. The “Fraud Story.”  Key to this interpretation were extracts from Iman-
ishi-Kari’s notebooks, including the seventeen pages discovered by O’Toole, as
well as subsequent forensic analyses by the Secret Service claiming that her
data had been recorded out of sequence and that original data could not have
been produced at the times she claimed.47  The chief proponents of this inter-
pretation were, to varying degrees, outsiders to the mainstream culture of bio-
                                                          
43. On June 21, 1996, the Research Integrity Adjudications Panel of the Department of Health and
Human Services, an appeals board, rejected ORI’s findings that Imanishi-Kari had fabricated data.  See
Noted Finding of Science Fraud Is Overturned by a Federal Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1996, at A1.
44. Dingell at the time chaired the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce.  In this capacity, he crusaded vigorously against perceived misuses
of public funds. Daniel Kevles, The Assault on David Baltimore, NEW YORKER, May 27, 1996, 94, 101.
45. This office was later reconstituted as the Office of Research Integrity.
46. Kevles, supra note 44, at 94-109.  As is evident from the title of Kevles’s piece, his sympathies lie
with Baltimore and Imanishi-Kari; he is thus himself a partisan of the “error story,” which portrays both
scientists in a more favorable light.
47. Id. at 107.
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medical science.  O’Toole, the reluctant whistle-blower, was probably the clos-
est to being an insider as she was an active post-doctoral student until her sus-
picions set her apart from her professional community.  Interestingly, in Kev-
les’s account, O’Toole at first suspected error but later changed her interpreta-
tion to fraud for personal reasons.48  Further out of the mainstream were Walter
Stewart, a scientist at NIH, who was reshaping his career as an outspoken critic
of scientific misconduct,49 Dingell, the legislator and vigilant guardian of public
expenditure, and Suzanne Hadley, the committed OSI official whom Kevles ac-
cuses of misguided sympathy with O’Toole and a faulty understanding of how
science is done.50
2. The “Error Story.”  This interpretation accepted, but characterized as
sloppiness or poor scientific judgment, some of the evidence offered by propo-
nents of the “fraud story,” such as discrepancies between Imanishi-Kari’s note-
books and the Cell paper.  It rejected outright, however, other evidence such as
some of the Secret Service’s forensic findings.51  Proponents of this interpre-
tation were mostly members in good standing of the relevant research commu-
nity.  Imanishi-Kari herself was one.  She excused her research practices as
“messy” but reliable, since she knew how to make sense of her own data.52  Bal-
timore, whose support of Imanishi-Kari was construed by some as an immoder-
ately arrogant defense of science, was another.  Also included were several in-
vestigative panels consisting of scientists appointed by Tufts, MIT, and NIH to
look into the substance of O’Toole’s inquiries, none of whom found a case of
serious professional misconduct.
C.  Conclusion
The characteristics of experimental practice and of experimentally derived
knowledge were as much at stake in the Imanishi-Kari case as in the contro-
versy over Gallo and Popovic.  In each case, popular opinion split between two
idealized—and equally unrealistic—versions of the scientific method: science as
cleanly rule-bound and governed by well-defined, communal standards of cor-
rect and deviant procedure, and science as the preserve of inspiration, intuition,
and risk-taking, where messy means could be condoned and even applauded
provided they supplied successful ends.  For members of the “science is clean”
school, both Popovic and Imanishi-Kari strayed from the paths of scientific
righteousness, perhaps to the point of moral transgression; for adherents of the
                                                          
48. Id. at 106.
49. Stewart, along with another NIH colleague, Ned Feder, was the co-author of a controversial and
widely discussed article on scientific misconduct in the journal Nature.  See Walter W. Stewart & Ned
Feder, The Integrity of the Scientific Literature, 325 NATURE 207 (1987).
50. Kevles, supra note 44, at 108.  “Some of the charges struck at [Imanishi-Kari’s] tendency not to
practice science in the mechanical way that Suzanne Hadley, for one, seems to think that it ought to be
practiced … .” Id.
51. In a nice display of experimenter’s regress, the Secret Service’s own techniques were declared
wanting by a forensic expert working for Imanishi-Kari.  This expert, as Kevles notes, “analyzed the Se-
cret Service findings and original material and reported that it was in fact impossible through the tech-
niques employed by the agency to draw any conclusions about when the [data] had been generated.”  Id.
52. Id. at 104.
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“science is messy” school, Popovic was a hero whose unique approach made a
recalcitrant virus grow, and Imanishi-Kari was not a heroine only because she
could report no comparable success.
In fact, these cases tell the observant analyst a more complex story than any
of the participants told.  “In human affairs, as in science,” asserts Kevles, “truth
is inseparable from the standards and processes used in determining it.”53
Truth, in other words, is a function of the socially constructed methods by
which human beings go about seeking the truth.  These methods, as the Gallo
and Imanishi-Kari cases bear out, are seldom unanimously accepted.  The ac-
ceptability of scientific methods depends considerably on the context of prac-
tice.  Messy and unorthodox methods that may be appropriate for cutting-edge
academic research, where replication is likely to weed out mistakes, are out of
place in a testing laboratory or clinical trial, where accidental contamination
could have devastating consequences and sound record-keeping and compara-
bility across cases are of paramount importance.54  The potential for variation in
standards of research methods led a panel of the National Academy of Sci-
ences, in 1992, to define a discrete category of “questionable research prac-
tices” and to exclude these from the official definition of scientific misconduct.55
Judgments about experimental validity, thus, cannot be made in a vacuum,
independent of any wider attempt at contextualization.  Cut loose from its do-
main of practice, an experimental claim ceases to be anchored to a communal
system of belief and, hence, is susceptible to deconstructive attack by anyone
who wishes to advance a contrary claim.  Scientific claims acquire enough force
to count as “knowledge” only through their incorporation into established, on-
going, collective routines of production and interpretation.  Validity judgments
within scientific subcultures, moreover, cannot be reduced to explicit rules that
others can mechanically apply because, as we have noted, much of the knowl-
edge that defines such cultures is tacit and defies complete codification.56  We
will return later to the implications of these observations for research subpoena
cases.
                                                          
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Jon Cohen, Clinical Trial Monitoring: Hit or Miss, 264 SCI. 1534 (1994).
55. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE: ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF
THE RESEARCH PROCESS (1992).  The report of the Panel on Scientific Responsibility and the Conduct of
Research defined “questionable research practices” as “actions that violate traditional values of the re-
search enterprise and that may be detrimental to the research process.”  Id. at 5.
56. Collins, supra note 21.  Tacit knowledge and culturally conditioned judgment present very general
problems for the law, as seen in contexts where experts are required, for legal reasons, to make their sci-
entific thought processes completely transparent.  Thus, regulatory agencies have faltered in their at-
tempts to reduce the risk assessment of carcinogenic chemicals to explicit and exhaustive principles.
Every such attempt has revealed new areas of judgment not yet encompassed by principles.  Controver-
sies about the regulation of carcinogens have, therefore, begotten an almost interminable deconstruction
of regulators’ technical judgments.  See Sheila Jasanoff, Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Exper-
tise at EPA, 7 OSIRIS 195 (1992).
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VI
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND FIELD NOTES
The disclosure of information from qualitative social science research en-
tails somewhat different consequences.  Confidentiality of research subjects is
perhaps the most generally recognized problem, and it is the one that courts
have grappled with the most extensively.57  The subjective (indeed, intersubjec-
tive) and non-standardized character of interviews and field notes creates more
subtle problems.
Practices for recording observations in qualitative research are less stan-
dardized than in experimental science, where, as we have seen, there is already
the potential for substantial variation among researchers and laboratories.  Dif-
ferent theoretical perspectives on qualitative research may give rise to diver-
gent objectives, sampling strategies, and ethics.58  Researchers may or may not
have received formal instruction in how to take, compose, or interpret field
notes.  The simultaneous creation of written notes and technological records,
such as video- and audiotapes, may increase the discrepancies, depending, for
example, on whether researchers see their notes as supplements to or back-ups
for taped records.  Rules or criteria for doing qualitative research may need
continual modification in light of the observed complexity of social phenom-
ena.59  Thus, contrary to judicial supposition, practices in the field can vary
widely.60
Comparing qualitative research findings with the underlying data can lead
to considerable confusion unless such work is handled sensitively.  One experi-
enced ethnographer, who is also a noted sociologist, summarizes the possible
                                                          
57. Courts may require the removal of identifying information (such as names, addresses, and birth
dates) from requested data.  See, e.g., In re Application of Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1525 (1989)
(describing precautions taken by tobacco company to preserve the confidentiality of epidemiological study
subjects).  Courts may also craft special procedural safeguards to protect the confidentiality of research
subjects.  For example, in 1992 a University of Alabama sociologist, J. Steven Picou, was subpoenaed by
the Exxon Shipping Co. to make available his work on community stress in Alaskan coastal villages fol-
lowing the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil tanker disaster.  The Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama granted Exxon’s request but stipulated that the information sought could be reviewed only by
the expert sociologist whom Exxon had retained to assess Picou’s files.  In turn, the expert was warned
that he could be cited for contempt if he failed to protect confidentiality.  Marshall, supra note 11, at 284.
For a relatively unsympathetic treatment of confidentiality claims, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated
January 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring justification for assurances of confidentiality
made to sources in a sociological study).
58. See, e.g., LEONARD SCHATZMAN & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, FIELD RESEARCH 8 (1973) (describing
disagreement between an anthropologist and other social scientists about whether certain Native Ameri-
can records constituted a “universe” within which random or stratified sampling could appropriately be
used).
59. See ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 249-58 (1990)
(calling attention to flexible nature of criteria and to differences between concepts such as
“reproducibility” in natural and social sciences).
60. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated January 4, 1984, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals asked
Mario Brajuha, a sociology graduate student, to establish “the nature and seriousness of the study and the
methodology employed” as a precondition for seeking a scholar’s privilege against disclosure.  750 F.2d at
225.  Such a request appears to presuppose greater methodological uniformity in sociological fieldwork
than may, in fact, exist.
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difficulties in this way:
How would I react if my field notes were submitted to a panel of outsiders?  I would
be uneasy about what such readers might make of the unsystematic, haphazard quali-
ties of what they would find in my notes.  There might be an occasional question of
confidentiality, but for the most part I would worry about assessments about the lack
of order, consistency, and the like, especially if I figured that these would be held up
against an idealized conception of method.  A more general problem has to do with
the fact that much of what I might say in a publication cannot easily be traced to spe-
cific notes taken at some occasion.  My field notes tend to describe what I happen to
have noted at a given time and place, and not more general, cumulative insights about
the routine order of things.61
If these habits are widely shared, then a social science researcher could be ex-
tremely vulnerable to charges of drawing conclusions that are insufficiently
substantiated by field records.
Drawing inferences from field notes and other observations tends, in any
case, to involve complex acts of interpretation rather than simple applications
of well-understood analytic principles.  Not only the recording, but also the in-
terpretation of qualitative data involves different ways of seeing and under-
standing social phenomena.  Even the most accurate records (for example,
videotapes) are subject to multiple interpretations.  Thus, in the infamous
Rodney King case, a single videotape, produced by a chance witness, of four
white police officers beating a seemingly helpless, unresisting black man was
interpreted in the courtroom to tell stories with very different moral implica-
tions and legal consequences.
Anthropologist Charles Goodwin observed in a perceptive analysis of the
first Rodney King trial that legal argumentation can transform raw sensory im-
pressions into “professional vision,” that is, into particular “socially organized
ways of seeing and understanding events that are answerable to the distinctive
interests of a particular social group.”62  Goodwin identified three interpretive
practices, coding, highlighting, and producing material representations, that the
lawyers and expert witnesses for the police officers used to impose their
“professional vision” on the ambiguous videotape.63  In the victim’s rendition,
the tape displayed a single, seamless episode of racially motivated police bru-
tality.  In the police officers’ version, as recounted by a specialist in police prac-
tice, the same incident was broken into a disjointed sequence of separate mini-
events that required expert decoding.64  Frame by frame, the jerky movements
of the victim’s body parts were interpreted as providing a plausible rationale
for “assessment periods,” “escalations of force,” and the delivery of strategi-
cally directed “kicks” and “blows.”65  Goodwin concluded that the fact finder’s
willingness to accept one reading of the evidence over another in such situa-
tions may have more to do with the professional power of the witnesses than
                                                          
61. Personal interview with Michael E. Lynch, Brunnel University, London (June 20, 1996)
(quotation is from a letter of Professor Lynch’s).
62. Charles Goodwin, Professional Vision, 96 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 606, 606 (1994).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 619-20.
65. Id. at 619-22.
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with abstract and absolute criteria of truth.66
The recognition of subjectivity in seeing and understanding cultures has
deeply influenced the way in which social scientists, particularly ethnographers,
view and practice their “science.”  Many modern ethnographers are intensely
aware of the historically and culturally situated character of their work, as well
as the frequent disparities in economic, political, and rhetorical resources be-
tween the observer and the observed.67  Sensitized in this way, they no longer
regard the observation of other cultures as objective fact finding from a value-
neutral standpoint.  The recording and writing of ethnography has changed to
reflect these new perceptions, as described by the historian and anthropologist
James Clifford:
Anthropological fieldwork has been represented as both a scientific “laboratory” and
a personal “rite of passage.”  The two metaphors capture nicely the discipline’s im-
possible attempt to fuse objective and subjective practices.  Until recently, this impos-
sibility was masked by marginalizing the intersubjective foundations of fieldwork, by
excluding them from serious ethnographic texts, relegating them to prefaces, mem-
oirs, anecdotes, confessions, and so forth.  Lately this set of disciplinary rules is giving
way.  The new tendency to name and quote informants more fully and to introduce
personal elements into the text is altering ethnography’s discursive strategy and mode
of authority.68
Shifts such as this carry numerous implications for legal fact finding.
After admitting the intersubjectivity of ethnographic fieldwork—that
“truth” in this context arises from the meshing or interpenetration of multiple
subjective viewpoints—researchers may take a variety of steps to ensure the
authoritativeness of their interpretations.  At one extreme is the practice, noted
by Clifford, of letting informants speak in their own voices.  Unfortunately this
opens up the further question of how typical or generalizable these voices may
be in relation to the culture they allegedly represent.  At the other extreme is
the effort to construct an “objective” truth by accumulating many individual
stories and systematizing them in accordance with a predetermined analytic
framework.  These stories, in turn, may be validated in different ways.  For ex-
ample, one researcher speaks of applying the test of “recognizability” by going
back to informants with a preliminary analysis and asking if it corresponds in a
recognizable way with the reality of their lives and experiences.69
The turn toward such dialogic methods of creating accounts of social reality
brings its own problems for legal practice and procedure.  First, there is the
mundane and recurrent issue of methodological conflict in a changing field, re-
quiring courts to sort out claims and counterclaims about “proper” methods
that have not yet been resolved by the discipline.  When disciplinary rules are
in transition, as they seem to be in ethnography, the possibility of distinguishing
                                                          
66. Id. at 624-26.
67. See generally WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James Clif-
ford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986); JOHN VAN MAANEN, TALES OF THE FIELD: ON WRITING
ETHNOGRAPHY (1988).
68. James Clifford, On Ethnographic Allegory, in WRITING CULTURE, supra note 67, at 109.
69. Personal interview with Dr. Keith Hawkins, University of Oxford (June 19, 1996).
JASANOFF.FMT 08/13/97  2:32 PM
Page 95: Summer 1996] RESEARCH SUBPOENAS 111
truth from falsehood, reasonable from unreasonable interpretations, and fringe
from mainstream practices becomes more difficult than when a discipline is in a
steadier state.  Methodological attacks, reflecting fundamental and unresolved
theoretical disagreements, are more frequent.  Under these circumstances, the
law’s institutional commitment to notions of unambiguous facticity and truth
run up against a reality in which knowledge is transparently value-laden, politi-
cal, and contested.
Second, there is the deeper issue of the cognitive status of notes and other
“one-sided” accounts of more complex realities.  Can an expert retained by a
party or appointed by the court reliably assess the accuracy or sufficiency of a
social researcher’s data without steeping herself in the situations from which
those data were drawn?  Can “truth” be determined from field notes and the
like without the participation of those whose words and actions are therein re-
corded?  More generally, how can courts accomplish their central mission of re-
solving disputes and creating order in cases involving social science information
if the scientific knowledge they rely on is shown, in many cases, to be both con-
tingent and open-ended?  We will return to these questions below.
VII
THE TESTIMONY OF PEERS
Because peer review can become a major issue in research subpoena cases,
judges should have a thorough grasp of the role that it plays in the production
of scientific knowledge.70  Questions concerning peer review can arise in two
ways.  First, a litigant may ask for information about peer review in an effort to
undermine the credibility of published scientific results.  For example, an attor-
ney representing plaintiffs in breast implant litigation served a subpoena on Dr.
Marcia Angell, an editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, for all rec-
ords pertaining to the peer review of an epidemiological study that reported no
correlation between silicone and immune system disorders.71  Second, subpoe-
naed information may be turned over for review to a party expert, whose con-
clusions in turn are presented to the courts as evidence.  For example, in a case
arising from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the court stipulated that raw and
unpublished data collected by a sociologist, J. Steven Picou, should be given for
evaluation to Exxon’s designated technical expert, Richard Berk, a sociologist
at the University of California, Los Angeles.  The court warned that Berk
might be cited for contempt if he failed to protect the confidentiality of Picou’s
data.72
                                                          
70. For descriptions and analyses of peer review in science, see generally John C. Burnham, The
Evolution of Peer Review, 263 JAMA 1323 (1990); Stephen Cole, et al., Chance and Consensus in Peer
Review, 214 SCI. 881 (1981); Marjorie Sun, Peer Review Comes Under Review, 244 SCI. 910 (1989.  See
also, BROAD & WADE, supra note 35, at 88-106; JASANOFF, supra note 10, at 64-76.
71. ANGELL, supra note 12.
72. Marshall, supra note 11, at 284.
JASANOFF.FMT 08/13/97  2:32 PM
112 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 59: No. 3
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,73 arguably the most influen-
tial decision concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence in the last half
century, encouraged judges to ask what makes science “scientific” and to apply
those criteria in discriminating good scientific evidence from bad.74  Judicial at-
tention was particularly drawn to peer review, which was one of the four crite-
ria explicitly endorsed by the Daubert majority.75  Peer review not only institu-
tionalizes science’s well-known capacity for self-criticism but provides on its
face a convenient procedural solution to a knotty substantive problem.  Courts
may be helpless when it comes to assessing scientific evidence on its merits, but
even a technically illiterate fact finder can ask whether a claim offered in evi-
dence has been peer reviewed and then devalue claims that have never been
exposed to this form of scrutiny.
Deference to peer review, however, appears to be giving way to a wholesale
skepticism that is equally problematic.  Peer review, as courts have rightly ac-
knowledged, is a cover term for a wide range of practices that can vary from
one scientific institution (for example, journals and granting agencies) to an-
other.  More than a decade of systematic research has made it plain that peer
review does not provide fail-safe guarantees of scientific integrity.76  At best,
peer review constitutes a partial screen, whose efficacy depends to some extent
on the reviewer’s skill, training, and professional biases.77  Even the Supreme
Court in Daubert registered skepticism about the filtering capacity of peer re-
view, noting that “publication (which is but one element of review) is not a sine
qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with credibility.”78
Skepticism about peer review, however, can be carried to extremes, as a
federal district court did in Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Company, Inc.79
Following Daubert, the district court held that the sole fact of publication in a
                                                          
73. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
74. A point insufficiently noted is that judges are permitted in the process to impose their own ideal-
ized, and for the most part unchallenged, understandings of science on legal decisionmaking.  This raises
obvious problems of accountability as further discussed below.  On the myth of mainstream science, see
JASANOFF, supra note 10, at 206-10.  For general commentary on Daubert, see Bert Black, et al., Science
and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994);
Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (1994); Kenneth R. Foster, et al., Science and the Toxic Tort, 261 SCI. 1509
(1993).
75. The so-called Daubert criteria for addressing questions of admissibility are the following: (1) has
the theory or technique underlying the proposed evidence been tested and can it be falsified; (2) has it
been peer reviewed; (3) if known, what is the technique’s error rate; and (4) is it generally accepted?
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.  These criteria are, of course, merely suggestions that a trial judge can con-
sider.  The Court did “not presume to set out a definite check-list … .” Id. at 593.  In the end, Daubert
stands for the use of discretion on the part of trial judges concerning the admission of scientific evidence.
76. See DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S.
SCIENCE POLICY (1990); STEPHEN LOCK, A DIFFICULT BALANCE: EDITORIAL PEER REVIEW IN
MEDICINE (1985); see also BROAD & WADE, supra note 35; JASANOFF, supra note 15.
77. Peer review has proven least effective as a screen against misconduct in the biomedical sciences.
One reason is that reviewers typically do not have access to the researcher’s raw data and cannot easily
judge whether results have been falsified or fabricated.
78. 509 U.S. at 593 (citing JASANOFF, supra note 15).
79. 921 F. Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996).
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peer-reviewed journal did not provide sufficient guarantee of scientific reliabil-
ity.  Conducting its own review of the expert’s scientific methods, the court
ruled inadmissible a published study which concluded that the plaintiffs’
claimed cognitive and emotional deficits had resulted from chlorine inhalation.
In reaching this result, the court distinguished between “editorial peer review,”
consisting of pre-publication review of an article by selected journal referees,
and “true peer review,” by which the judge apparently meant all post-
publication attempts to replicate or otherwise build on published scientific re-
sults.  “Editorial peer review,” the court opined, could be accorded relatively
low respect in forensic settings because of the review’s narrow scope and be-
cause “the average referee spends less than two hours assessing an article sub-
mitted to a biomedical journal.”80
Such dismissive treatment misses the important constructive purpose of
prepublication peer review.  Within science, the policing function of peer re-
view is deemed on the whole subordinate to its role in holding scientists to
higher, communally certified standards of reasoning and presentation.  That re-
viewers may not discover clever or determined instances of data falsification is
today a foregone conclusion; scientists, as the Valentine court correctly ob-
served, rely on the more deliberate processes of replication and cross-checking
to root out and discard such abuses.  Instead, reviewers for scientific journals
and research grants are expected to apply the standards of their field fairly and
dispassionately to every submission, treating it as a potential contribution to
knowledge.  Peer review thus refines the analysis of scientific data, points out
inadequacies in argument, sharpens the focus of conclusions, and improves the
clarity of expression.  Science that survives peer review enters by definition into
the collaborative enterprise of knowledge-making.  Its findings may still be set
aside in time, as unimportant or misdirected, or be modified in important par-
ticulars.81  But peer-reviewed science is earmarked at the very least as having
met a research community’s threshold criteria of legitimacy, relevance, and in-
terest.  For a court to rule such work inadmissible on the basis of its own meth-
odological inquiry, as was done in Valentine, raises serious questions of judicial
accountability.82
As the foregoing account suggests, scientific peer review is likely to differ
                                                          
80. Id. at 675 (citing Stephen Lock & Jane Smith, What do Peer Reviewers Do?, 263 JAMA 1341,
1341-43 (1990)).
81. For an illuminating account of how the initial publication of the structure of DNA was mistaken
in key respects, see FRANCIS CRICK, WHAT MAD PURSUIT (1988).  See also FLECK, supra note 18.
82. Several points about Valentine are worth noting.  From a legal standpoint, the court appears to
have determined admissibility in accordance with criteria that would have been more appropriate for
judging the weight of the evidence.  See Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at 670-71.  Further, in distinguishing be-
tween “editorial” and “true” peer review, the judge made a number of unverified (possibly unverifiable)
assumptions about science.  For example, he assumed that all published science gives rise to post-
publication scrutiny and that the quality of pre-publication review is a function of time spent on it.  Id. at
675.  He also assumed that “obscure” journals are less reliable than better known ones.  Id. at 670 n.3.
Needless to say, neither the Valentine court’s implicit model of science nor its specific methodological cri-
tique of the rejected evidence was subjected to the equivalent of “editorial peer review.”  Whether it will
be subjected to “true peer review,” and what that might mean in practice, remains to be seen.
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markedly in its objectives and impact from review carried out by an expert in a
litigation context.  In legal review, the goal is neither to make good work better
nor to retrieve what might be of value from work of lesser significance.  It is,
instead, to seek as aggressively as possible to discredit the proffered evidence
and to deploy in the process all the skeptical resources that experts engaged
specifically for this purpose can muster.  Litigation-centered review thus differs
in three crucial respects from peer review as usually practiced in science:
(1) It serves the litigants’ pecuniary interests rather than the disci-
plinary interests of a well-defined scientific community.  The reviewer
may belong in fact to an entirely distinct scientific subculture from the
person whose work is being reviewed.83
(2) It operates on the principle of exclusion rather than inclusion by
aiming to deny scientific status to questioned results.  Its purpose is to
expose gaps and omissions in the translation from observation to result.
Hence it is inherently unforgiving.  In Imanishi-Kari’s case, such atti-
tudes led some reviewers to see fraud where others had seen only error.
(3) It holds research to idealized norms of good practice that do not
necessarily conform to the actual practices and tacit knowledge of
workers in any field.  In the Gallo-Popovic investigation, such idealized
accounts of science underwrote radically different interpretations of the
accused scientists’ research ethics.
For these reasons, the review of subpoenaed research materials by partisan
experts should not be seen as a simple extension of ordinary scientific peer re-
view, like adding another pair of discerning eyes to an existing, but inadequate,
critical apparatus, or even as “true peer review” in the terms of the Valentine
court.  The same alleged “flaws” could well come to light in pre-publication and
in litigation-centered review processes, but for the reasons stated above, the
normative readings placed on them would probably diverge materially.  In at-
tempting to weigh different readings of the same data, judges should try to un-
derstand the basis for such divergences and to manage them appropriately.
VIII
JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM
To review scientists’ research materials in the course of litigation, therefore,
is not to continue the work of science by other means, but rather to engage sci-
ence in an alien field of inquiry, governed in part by different rules of the game.
In the litigation context, scientists are deprived of many supports that protect
their work against unbounded skepticism and forgive minor errors or devia-
                                                          
83. Recent tensions over attempts to consolidate peer review panels for neuroscience at the NIH un-
derscore the importance of such disciplinary differences.  While the distinction between “biopsychology”
and “psychobiology” may not be apparent to outsiders, they are real and consequential to those inside
these fields.  See Elliot Marshall, Despite Anxiety, NIH Begins Merging Neuroscience Panels, 273 SCI. 731
(1996).
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tions in the interest of promoting legitimate inquiry.  These supports include
shared, tacit knowledge about what “works,” communal standards of good
practice, cultural ties that bestow credibility within research communities,84 the
testing of promising work by other investigators, and an overriding interest in
the larger enterprise of creating new knowledge.  In the courtroom, moreover,
science is reevaluated in accordance with idealized lay conceptions of “the sci-
entific method” that are insufficiently attuned to its genuine complexity and di-
versity.  The fact that scientific claims unravel and that “truth” is difficult to re-
construct under legal scrutiny is well established from studies of regulatory
science.85  Research subpoenas place science and scientists in a similar predica-
ment, without the assurance that second-guessing will produce a more robust
form of knowledge, let alone the “truth.”
Skepticism toward science, however, is not intrinsically unwarranted, and
researchers should not be granted full immunity merely because their work has
satisfied their own professional community’s standards of criticism and peer re-
view.  Cases of scientific fraud and misconduct offer powerful evidence that
autonomy and responsibility do not necessarily go hand in hand.86  As related
by the science journalists William Broad and Nicholas Wade, “[s]cience is not
self-policing.  Scholars do not always read the scientific literature carefully.
Science is not a perfectly objective process.”87  Qualified external critics,
moreover, may uncover problems not perceived by closed communities of prac-
tice, as happened in the case of DNA typing.  To make science serve justice, it
may be desirable, and occasionally essential, to step outside the charmed circles
of intra-disciplinary criticism.
How should courts manage the review of subpoenaed research materials so
as to advance the cause of truth-seeking but to reduce the risk of imposing, or
deferring to, misleading views of scientific practice?  Three approaches merit
consideration as they relate to the sources of misunderstanding described
above: the screening of party experts; the appointment of independent experts;
and the use of review panels.  Each has costs and benefits that need to be care-
fully weighed in the context of specific cases.
A.  Screening Party Experts
A relatively low-cost approach to assuring more balanced assessment of re-
search records is for courts to screen the expert reviewers selected by the par-
ties.  By asking appropriately targeted questions, courts can exclude wholly un-
qualified experts, as well as help focus the issues in dispute and make sure they
are located in clearly defined and relevant disciplinary and methodological
                                                          
84. Shapin, supra note 14; see also STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH (1994).
85. DAVID COLLINGRIDGE & COLIN REEVE, SCIENCE SPEAKS TO POWER: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
IN POLICY (1986); see also JASANOFF, supra note 15.
86. Patricia Woolf, Integrity and Accountability, in THE FRAGILE CONTRACT 82 (David H. Gus-
ton & Kenneth Keniston eds., 1994); David H. Guston, The Demise of the Social Contract for Science:
Misconduct in Science and the Nonmodern World, 38 THE CENTENNIAL REVIEW 215 (1994).
87. BROAD & WADE, supra note 35, at 210.
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frameworks.  In general, the purpose of such screening would be to secure
timely disclosure of important biases rather than to exclude expert witnesses
from testifying.
Criteria that courts may use in this connection include straightforward tests
of credibility—whether, for example, the expert has been a “repeat witness” in
litigation, maintains an active professional life in science or medicine, or is a
known professional adversary of the person whose work is to be reviewed.88
Identification of experts who testify frequently should be assisted by recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that require parties to list
recent testimony, as part of the standard disclosure, when proffering expert tes-
timony.89  State laws can provide collateral support, for instance, by limiting the
percentage of income that medical or other experts may earn from appearing as
expert witnesses.  Courts in any event can operationalize some of the insights
gained from the sociology of science by asking party-selected experts to reveal
in advance the nature and sources of the standards they will use in reviewing
subpoenaed materials.
B. Appointing Independent Experts
To correct for the biases of party-selected experts, who may represent ex-
treme viewpoints, the court can appoint independent experts.  The principal
disadvantage, apart from potentially significant issues of cost and inefficiency,
is that the independent experts’ own biases could be veiled by the presumption
of neutrality that attaches to being appointed by the court.  By remaining invisi-
ble, these biases could exert undue influence on the fact-finding process.90  In
line with the analysis presented in this article, independent experts would be
most helpful to courts not by resolving disputes about research information but
rather by locating them within an overall topography of scientific practice.  The
experts can educate courts about the status of methodological controversies,
make discriminations between fraud and “normal” carelessness or error, and
thus help separate important from trivial issues.
Courts may face a threshold difficulty in identifying suitable experts to play
this impartial, educative role.  A proposal developed by the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science to create rosters of suitable experts, with
assistance from leading professional societies, could help overcome this obsta-
cle.91  Professional groups, however, may have their own economic and social
                                                          
88. Courts may be assisted in the task of screening by state statutes establishing professional stan-
dards for expert witnesses.  For example, an Illinois law requires that, to qualify as an expert witness, a
medical professional must have devoted 75% of his or her time to medical practice, research, or teaching.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/8-2501(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (1995).
90. For an example of the wide-ranging influence that can be exerted by “neutral” experts, see Com-
puter Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated in part on other grounds,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (MIT computer science professor proposed standards for incorporation into
copyright law).
91. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, PROPOSAL—PROVIDING
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO THE FEDERAL COURTS: A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT OF
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biases to which judges should always be attentive.
C. Utilizing Review Panels
Courts can also seek advice from a panel of experts instead of, or in addi-
tion to, the testimony offered by individual party experts.  A procedure like this
would most closely parallel scientific peer review by drawing on a range of
opinion rather than a single, narrow slice.  If appropriately designed, the proce-
dure can have the merit of holding subpoenaed research to communal and
widely accepted standards of performance rather than the personal and possi-
bly idiosyncratic standards of individual experts.
As seen above in the cases of Gallo and Imanishi-Kari,92 however, panel re-
view does not automatically guard against the imposition of idealized notions
of scientific practice on questioned work.  This review may intensify, rather
than correct, inappropriate disciplinary biases.  Unless the panel adequately
represents relevant viewpoints, its conclusions may be biased or flawed.93  Fi-
nally, cost would be an even more salient consideration with a panel than with a
single independent expert.
IX
CONCLUSION
In the end, the most effective way to integrate scientific knowledge fully
and fairly into legal decisionmaking may indeed be, as the Daubert court pro-
posed, for judges to develop a keener sense of how science works.  Judges are
best positioned to fashion case-specific procedures, orders, and management
practices that respect the complexities of both scientific research and the par-
ticular litigation context. In order to acquire the necessary sixth sense for sci-
ence, judges will have to reach beyond lawyers’, scientists’, and even the Su-
preme Court’s idealized or wishful fictions about the conduct of research.  They
will have to abandon any naive faith in the existence of a single, well-
demarcated, unchanging canon of good scientific practice.  They will have to
develop a greater sensitivity to the ambiguous, provisional, and partial nature
of much science that is presented as hard, unambiguous, and conclusive by liti-
                                                          
AAAS (April 16, 1996).
92. See supra part III.A-B.
93. A high-level expert panel that notably failed to generate a scientific consensus was the first com-
mittee appointed by the National Research Council to review the methodology of DNA typing.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (1992), supra note 32.  The principal point of contention was the panel’s
treatment of population genetics and its endorsement of a controversial statistical standard known as the
“ceiling principle.”  See Lander & Budowle, supra note 31, at 735-36.  Controversies over the first panel’s
report led to the appointment of a second panel, the Committee on DNA Forensic Science, with different
membership from the first.  It remains to be seen whether the second panel’s report will achieve more sci-
entific and legal authority.  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE (1996).
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gating parties and their chosen experts.  They will also have to recognize, and
make appropriate allowances for, the communal or collective nature of scien-
tific judgments and their embeddedness in particular cultures of scientific prac-
tice.  This article has suggested ways in which the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge can make available additional resources for such advances in judicial
understanding.
